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Abstract
The measurement of social polarization has received little atten-
tion from the literature. The only social polarization index that has
been used to measure religious or ethnic polarization (the RQ index)
has several shortcomings that are critically discussed in the paper. In
particular, that index is not taking into account the existing distance
between and within di¤erent groups. A couple of axiomatically char-
acterized social polarization indices that overcome these limitations
are presented. In the empirical section we show that the rankings
of countries according to the levels of polarization change to a great
extent when we replace the RQ index by the indices presented in this
paper.
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1 Introduction
The measurement of polarization has witnessed an increasing interest in the
past few years both from theorists and practitioners. This is mainly due to
the fact that the notion of polarization is closely related to the existence of so-
cial tension or conict phenomena which can not be appropriately predicted
by traditional inequality measures. Nowadays, it is widely acknowledged
that polarization measures are much more appropriate for the purpose of
capturing social tension and conictivity than inequality measures. The rst
papers to deal with the measurement of polarization in a rigorous way were
those of Esteban and Ray (1994) (from now on ER94) and Wolfson (1994),
which laid the foundations of many polarization indices that were to fol-
low with its corresponding empirical applications (see, for example, Duclos,
Esteban and Ray (2004) (from now on DER), Wolfson (1997), Alesina and
Spalaore (1997), Quah (1997), Wang and Tsui (2000), Esteban, Gradín and
Ray (2007), Chakravary and Majumder (2001), Zhang and Kanbur (2001)
and Rodriguez and Salas (2002)). It is important to point out that all these
papers focus their attention on the measurement of income polarization.
However, the distribution of income or wealth is not always the cause of
social tension or conicts, so it soon became evident that there was a need
to extend the notion of polarization to broader contexts. From now on, we
will use the term social polarization when the factors that determine the
tension or conictivity in a given population are socially driven and do not
depend on the distribution of income. Classical examples of these factors
are ethnic, religious or nationalistic feelings. In contrast with its importance,
the literature has not devoted much attention to the measurement of social
polarization. To our knowledge, the only papers that have proposed a pure
social polarization index are those of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2002,
2005a, 2005b) and Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) . In the later paper,
an attempt is made to propose certain hybrid polarization indices which lie
somewhere between the concepts of income and social polarization. These
indices are not axiomatically characterized; they are liberal transplants from
the pure income polarization index dened in their paper, so, the authors
acknowledge, they are somewhat arbitrary and open to legitimate criticism.
Exactly the same can be said about the social polarization index intro-
duced in the papers of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol. The so-called Reynal-
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Querol index (RQ) used in their papers can be seen as the ER94 income
polarization index adapted to the context of social polarization by arbitrar-
ily disregarding the alienation component of the index. The RQ index is
used in Montalvo, Reynal-Querol (2005a) to predict the occurrence of Civil
Wars and in Montalvo, Reynal-Querol (2005b) to predict the growth rate of
GDP per capita.
The main purpose of this paper is to present axiomatically characterized
social polarization indices that overcome the several limitations of the RQ
index, which stands out as the single social polarization index that has been
used in practice to explain the occurrence of social conicts like Civil Wars
or the evolution of economic growth. The limitations of that index can be
summarized as follows. As mentioned earlier, the index is not axiomatically
characterized, so it might be criticized on grounds of arbitrariness1. More
importantly, the denition of the index assumes that the di¤erent population
groups in which the society is splitted (say, religious or ethnic groups) are
equally alienated vis-à-vis each other. In other words, it assumes that the
distance between any couple of groups (i.e: the feeling of animosity) is the
same no matter which groups we are comparing. In order to justify this
decision, the authors contend that If we want to calculate ethnic (religious)
polarization using the index P , we need to calculate the distance between
di¤erent ethnic (religious) groups, which is a very di¢ cult task compared to
what happens in the case of income or wealth(Montalvo and Reynal -Querol
2005b, p. 301). However, ruling out the role of alienation in a polarization
index misses an essential part of its denition. It seems hardly questionable
that, xing the size of the groups, the higher the distance between them,
the higher the corresponding level of social tension and polarization. Now,
we contend that, regardless of the acknowledged di¢ culties involved in the
calculation of distances between groups, a social polarization indexmust take
the alienation factor into account.
In this paper we have proposed a couple of models that try to take into
account the notion of alienation/distance between individuals. In the rst
1The importance of providing axiomatic characterizations of social indicators is widely
acknowledged and has been discussed elsewhere. The axioms represent the basic properties
satised by the indices which, joint together, characterize them uniquely. Hence, they are
very useful to discriminate between di¤erent indices according to the corresponding basic
properties they satisfy and their normative implications.
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one, it is assumed that individuals belonging to di¤erent groups do feel alien-
ated vis-à-vis each other according to a distance function that depends on the
intensity with which they feel to belong to their particular group. We assume
that, other things being equal, the stronger the feeling of individualsiden-
tity with their own group, the higher the corresponding distance/alienation
between them. In the second model, the notion of distance between indi-
viduals is not only important for the measurement of polarization between
groups but also to measure polarization within groups. Given the fact that
social tension or conict could arise within the members of a given group,
it seems reasonable to make room to capture those phenomena. The choice
between these two models for empirical purposes might crucially depend on
the accuracy of the underlying hypotheses for the specic context in which
they will be used. For both models, an axiomatic characterization for the
corresponding social polarization index is provided using di¤erent sets of
axioms.
As mentioned before, these models can be very useful to measure the
levels of religious or ethnic polarization. In the empirical section we compare
the values of the RQ index with the values of the indices introduced in this
paper. It turns out that introducing the notion of distance between groups
to measure religious polarization is a very relevant issue: the corresponding
rankings of countries in terms of religious polarization changes to a great ex-
tent. These results suggest that the inclusion of alienation/distance between
individuals is a crucial element that can make an important di¤erence when
measuring the levels of polarization at the country level.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we examine our rst
model in which alienation is measured between individuals of di¤erent groups
only. We present a set of axioms that characterize the corresponding social
polarization index. In section 3 we examine our second model in which social
tension is allowed to take place both between and within groups. Again, we
present a di¤erent set of axioms that characterize the corresponding social
polarization index. Section 4 contains the empirical results of the paper, in
which we compare the values of the di¤erent indices. We conclude in section
5. The proofs are relegated to the appendix
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2 Measuring social polarization between groups
The measurement of social polarization is inspired by the notions introduced
in the measurement of income polarization. We will take the ideas and mod-
els introduced in ER94 as our starting point. There, it was assumed that
polarization could be dened as the sum of all possible e¤ective antagonisms
between individuals. Moreover, in the model proposed in that paper, the
antagonism felt by individual i towards j depends on the so-called identica-
tion and alienation components. The alienation component reects the fact
that two individuals can be very di¤erent from each other and the greater
the di¤erence, the greater the contribution to overall social tension or conic-
tivity. In ER94, the alienation / distance between individuals is measured as
the absolute di¤erence in respective incomes. The identication component
is introduced to capture the idea that, the greater the size of the group to
which an individual belongs, the greater his/her possibilities of making an ef-
fective voicing of his/her alienation. If the population is splitted in n groups
of size i (i = 1; : : : ; n), each of which with an income level of yi, Esteban
and Ray characterize axiomatically the following income polarization index:
P (;y) = K
nP
i=1
nP
j=1
1+i jjyi   yjj (1)
where K > 0 and  2 (0; 1:6]: Here, the identication component equals
i and the alienation from i towards j is jyi   yjj. In a later paper, Duclos,
Esteban and Ray provide an analogous result for continuous income distrib-
utions f(x) (see DER). The index is written as
P(f) 
Z Z
f(x)1+f(y)jy   xjdydx (2)
with  2 [0:25; 1]; which is the continuous analogue of (1).
When these ideas are extrapolated to the context of social polarization one
faces an important problem, namely: how to measure the distances between
N di¤erent groups (with N  2). In Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2002,
2005a, 2005b) a draconian solution is proposed: to assume that the distances
are the same for no matter which group we are comparing. Hence they present
what they call a discrete polarization index dened as
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DP (; k) = k
NP
i=1
P
j 6=i
1+i j (3)
which is a liberal transplant from P (;y) under the assumption of equal
distances between all pairs of groups. Moreover, they show that the only
values of ; k for which DP (; k) satises certain reasonable properties are
1 and 4 respectively (see Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2002)). In that case,
they obtain the Reynal-Querol index, dened as
RQ = 1 
NP
i=1

1=2  i
1=2
2
i = DP (1; 4) (4)
We contend that by excluding the alienation component in the denition
of the index, one misses one of the essential aspects of polarization. It seems
beyond question that, ceteris paribus, the level of social polarization in a given
population must be sensitive to the existing feelings of animosity between
groups. At this moment, we present a model that takes into account the
notion of alienation / distance between individuals.
2.1 The model (1)
Suppose we haveN exogenously given groups, withN  2. Typical examples
might be religious or ethnic groups, but the denition is left as general as
possible, so other groupings are also possible. We assume that these groups
are cohesive and relevant in dening individualssense of identity. Tipically,
these groups are competing for a share of power or to enforce their own
interests. Now, we assume that each individual has a given feeling of identity
with the group to which he/she belongs. This feeling of identity is assumed to
be closely related to the corresponding degree of involvement when pursuing
the interests of the group, which in many cases is a reasonable assumption.
We will denote by x (x 2 R+) the intensity with which individuals feel to
belong to their particular group, and call this number radicalism degree. This
way, we want our measure to be sensitive to the degree to which individuals
feel involved with their own group and not only to the mere fact of belonging
or not belonging to a particular group as it happens with the RQ index,
since this might greatly inuence the polarization levels in a given society.
For each population group we will have an unnormalized density function
6
fi(x) that measures the way in which the radicalism degree is distributed
therein. We are assuming that the support of each fi(x) is R+.
We introduce the following notation. The whole population mass is equal
to M and the population mass of each group equals Mi. The population
share of group i is i = Mi=M . Hence, for each radicalism degree density
function one has that
R
R+ fi(x) = Mi. From now, the density functions for
the whole population will be thought a collection of N unnormalized density
functions (one for each population subgroup), that is fN : RN+ ! RN+ where
fN(x1; : : : ; xN) = (f1(x1); : : : ; fN(xN)). When no confusion arises, fN will be
simply written as f . The population shares vector associated to f will be
denoted by  = (1; : : : ; N).
We can now adapt the identity-alienation framework introduced in ER94
to the present context. For an individual belonging to group i 2 f1; : : : ; Ng,
we assume that the identity component depends on the corresponding size
Mi. This is equivalent to say that an individual feels identied with all
the members of his/her own group, which is another way of stating that
the groups are cohesive and relevant in dening individualsidentity feelings
and that two individuals belonging to the same group de not feel alienated
vis-à-vis each other. Regarding the alienation component for individuals in
di¤erent groups, let us consider two individuals of radicalism degrees x; y.
Since radicalism degrees are associated with individualsdegree of involve-
ment when pursuing the interests of their group and since the di¤erent groups
are competing for a share of power, we will simply assume that alienation is
monotonically increasing in x + y. This way, we capture the idea that the
higher the involvement of individuals in pursuing the interests of their own
groups, the higher the level of social tension. Now, let us dene e¤ective
antagonism as a nonnegative function T (; a), where it is assumed that T
is continuous, increasing in its second argument and T (; 0) = T (0; a) = 0.
Finally, polarization is assumed to be proportional to the sum of all e¤ective
antagonisms, so that, if f  (f1; : : : ; fN)
PN(f) =
NP
i=1
NP
j=1
Z Z
T ((x); a(x; y))fi(x)fj(y)dydx (5)
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Under the aforementioned identication-alienation assumptions, (5) can
be rewritten as
PN(f) =
NP
i=1
P
j 6=i
Z Z
T (Mi; x+ y)fi(x)fj(y)dydx (6)
We will present some reasonable axioms under which the previous formula
can be written down more explicitly in a more operational way.
2.2 The axioms (1).
In order to present our axioms, we will use the notions of basic densities
and roots presented in DER. A basic density is a density function which is
unnormalized by population size, symmetric, unimodal, with compact and
connected support. A root is a basic density with mean 1 and support [0; 2]
with population size set to unity.
Axiom 1. Consider a distribution in which each population group has
the same density function fi(x) composed of a single basic density. Suppose,
moreover, that one of the population groups has an additional (outer) basic
density (with disjoint support sharing the same root as in Figure 1) and that
the population mass of the inner one is not smaller than the population mass
of the outer one. The population share is the same for all N groups. Then, if
the inner and the outer densities of the two-densities group approach to each
other by the same amount slide (while keeping disjoint supports), polarization
must not decrease.
This axiom reects the following idea. Suppose that within a given group,
we have a populous subgroup of low radical individuals and another smaller
subgroup of more radicalized individuals. Then, other things being equal,
if the rst and second subgroups increase and decrease respectively their
radicalism by the same amount, polarization should increase because after
the transformation, the average level of radicalism of the whole group has
increased.
Axiom 2. Consider a distribution in which each population group has
a density function fi(x) composed of a single basic density. Suppose, more-
over, that the population mass of the rst group (M1) is not bigger than the
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Figure 1: Two basic densities approaching within a group.
Figure 2: A small group becoming less radical and a radicalizing big group.
population mass of the second group (M2). Slide the members of the rst
group inwards and the members of the second group outwards (by the same
amount) as in Figure 2. Then polarization must not decrease.
This axiom captures the intuitive idea that, other things being equal, if
there are two groups, the rst one being less numerous than the second, with
the members of the smaller group becoming less radicalized and the mem-
bers of the bigger group becoming more radicalized, in overall polarization
should increase. In other words, our polarization index must be sensitive
to the sizes of the di¤erent population groups and give more emphasis to
the transformations of the bigger ones. This axiom can be thought as the
between-group versionof axiom 1.
In order to motivate the following axiom we will consider the following
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distribution. Suppose that one has three groups, one with a largemass
and the other two with equally smallmasses. Moreover, it is assumed that
the radicalism distributions have the same normalized density functions. In
this scenario, polarization is arbitrarily low because population is mostly
concentrated in a single group and it is assumed that individuals within a
given group do not feel alienated vis-à-vis each other. Consider now the
process of transferring population mass from the big group to the smaller
ones by the same amount. In this context we present an axiom imposing a
natural condition on the population transfer process.
Axiom 3. Consider the 3-group distribution where each group has the
same normalized density function and with respective population masses m;n; n
(m > n > 0). Then, a population mass transfer from the big group to the
smaller ones by the same amount without altering the size rank of the groups
will not decrease polarization.
The intuition behind this axiom is straightforward. In the process of
transferring population mass from the big group to the smaller ones, the
groups become gradually similar, thus equating their relative forces and in-
creasing the tension between them. It seems reasonable to say that, other
things being equal, a distribution with three equally populated and equidis-
tant groups is more likely to stir conict than another one in which one of
the groups happens to be more populated than the other two.
Axiom 4. If PN(f)  PN(g) and p > 0 then PN(pf)  PN(pg); where
pf and pg represent population scalings of f and g respectively.
This population invariance axiom is very common in the literature of
well-being or inequality measurement. It states that if polarization is higher
in one situation than in another, it must continue to be so when populations
in both situations are scaled up or down by the same amount.
2.3 Characterization theorems (1).
Theorem 1. A polarization measure as dened in (6) satises axioms 1, 2,
3 and 4 if and only if it is proportional to
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P bN;(f) =
NP
i=1
P
j 6=i
Mi
Z Z
fi(x)fj(y)(x+y)dydx 
NP
i=1
P
j 6=i
1+i j(i+j) (7)
where  2 (0; 1] and i is the mean value of the radicalism distribution
fi(x):
This theorem shows that, under the assumptions specied in the model,
some mild restrictions completely specify the functional form of T (i; a). The
polarization index dened in (7) is a generalization of the discrete polarization
measure DP (; k), where the absence of an alienation component has now
been substituted by a much richer structure that is sensitive to individuals
radicalism distribution. In this sense, the new measure enlarges the previous
ones to a richer framework. Clearly, if all i happen to be the same, P
b
N;(f)
reduces to the DP (; k) index.
What happens with P bN;(f) when  = 0?. Rewriting expression (7), we
would obtain that
P bN;0(f) 
NP
i=1
P
j 6=i
ij(i + j):
This formula could be interpreted as a weighted fractionalization index2,
where each weight equals i+j. In particular, when i = j 8i 6= j, P bN;0(f)
reduces to the classical fractionalization index. Since this is not what a
polarization measure is intended to measure, the value of  is required to be
strictly above 0. As is well known, the value of  has to be treated as the
degree of polarization sensitivity (see ER(1994)) and the larger is its value,
the greater is the departure from inequality measurement. However, the fact
that  can approach as much as desired the value of 0 is uncomfortable, since
it seems as if the boundaries between polarization and other measures were
somewhat fuzzy and not clearly delimited in this context. One possible way
of raising this lower bound is to impose the following reasonable axiom.
2Recall that the fractionalization index is dened as FRAC =
P
i
P
j 6=i ij . It is
interpreted as the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a given pop-
ulation will not belong to the same group, so it has usually been used as a measure of
population heterogeneity.
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Axiom 5. Consider a symmetric conguration in which all density func-
tions fi(:) are the same basic density and in which all population shares are
equal. Then, PN1(f)  PN2(f) for any N1  N2  2:
This axiom captures the widespread idea that, other things being equal,
the larger the number of groups, the lower the corresponding polarization.
Some authors have used this idea or very similar ones in the study of conict
and polarization (see, for example, Esteban and Ray (1994,1999) or Montalvo
and Reynol-Queral (2002, 2005a, 2005b), who trace this idea from the seminal
works of Horowitz (1985)). It is important to recall that this axiom would not
make sense if our purpose were to measure bipolarization, as is the case, for
example, of the Wolfson Index. Imposing this mild restriction, one obtains
the following theorem.
Theorem 2. A polarization measure as dened in (6) satises axioms
1,2,3,4 and 5 if and only if it is proportional to
P bN;1(f) =
NP
i=1
P
j 6=i
Mi
Z Z
fi(x)fj(y)(x+ y)dydx 
NP
i=1
P
j 6=i
2ij(i + j) (8)
In this case, the only possible value of  is reduced to 1. It must be
pointed out that xing the admissible values for  at a single value simplies
matters greatly for any empirical application. Clearly, this is a generalization
of theRQ index: when i = j 8i 6= j, P bN;1(f)  RQ. The social polarization
index we have axiomatically characterized is appealing for di¤erent reasons.
From one side it keeps a simple and intuitive functional form, which makes
it easier to understand and to implement empirically. From the other side,
it incorporates in a simple way the alienation component which was lacking
in DP (; k) or RQ. Hence, P bN;1 is sensitive not only to the size of the
competing groups but also to the existing feeling of animosity between them.
3 Measuring social polarization between and
within groups
In the previous section, we presented a model in which alienation was as-
sumed to be a between group phenomenon only. However, one might well
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argue that alienation can be felt between members within the same group.
Take the case, for instance, of a group sharply divided in two subgroups:
those who are less radical and those who are more radical. It might be rea-
sonable to say that the social tension existing within this group should a¤ect
somehow overall social tension. For this reason, in this section we introduce
an alternative model in which room is made for within group alienation.
In this new model, we keep some of the ideas and tools which were in-
troduced in the previous section. In particular, we still assume that the
population in partitioned in N  2 groups and that each individual has
a radicalism degree of x 2 R+. In each group we have a density function
fi(x) for the corresponding radicalism distribution. When it comes to dene
alienation between individuals of radicalism degrees x; y respectively, we dis-
tinguish two cases. In the rst case, if individuals belong to di¤erent groups
it is reasonable to assume, as before, that alienation should be monotonically
increasing in x+y. The motivation for this choice is exactly the same, namely:
the higher (lower) the involvement of individuals in pursuing the interests of
their own groups, the higher (lower) the level of social tension. In the second
case, if individuals belong to the same group, it seems reasonable to impose
that alienation between them should be monotonically increasing in jx   yj
(this is analogous to the assumption made in the context of income polar-
ization). Under these assumptions, we are implicitly asserting that, ceteris
paribus, individuals of a given group tend to feel less alienated with respect
to the members of the same group than with the members of other groups,
which in many cases seems to be a plausible hypothesis. Concerning identi-
cation, perhaps the most reasonable identication function for an individual
belonging to group i with radicalism degree x should be fi(x). This choice
is plausible because in this model, each individual feels alienated towards all
individuals of other groups and all individuals of the same group but with dif-
ferent radicalism degree. Hence, the amount of individuals which are exactly
like him/her is simply fi(x): Under these assumptions, total polarization as
in equation (5) can be rewritten as
PN(f) =
NP
i=1
Z Z
T (fi(x); jx yj)fi(x)fi(y)dydx+
NP
i=1
P
j 6=i
Z Z
T (fi(x); x+y)fi(x)fj(y)dydx
(9)
Recall that the rst component of this equation is the contribution of
polarization within groups and that the second component corresponds to
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polarization between groups. The index presented in equation (9) is too
vague and cannot be used in practice. As before, we present a set of axioms
that pins down an explicit and operational formulation of the polarization
index.
3.1 The axioms (2).
We will use the same concepts and notation as before, namely: basic densi-
ties, roots and its transformations. In particular, we will also use the concept
of -squeeze of a basic density introduced in DER. Given any basic density g
with mean  and  2 (0; 1], a -squeeze of g is dened as the mean-preserving
transformation
g(x) :=
1

g

x  (1  )


:
Recall that g is nothing but a compression of g around its mean. More-
over, we will need to introduce the following sets. Dene
N := f(1; : : : ; N) 2 RN+ j
P
i i = 1g
the standard simplex in RN and
B := f(1; : : : ; N) 2 N ji = j = 12 for some i 6= j 2 f1; : : : ; Ngg:
The set B contains the population shares in which only two popula-
tion groups have (the same) positive mass, that is: it contains the equally
weighted bipolar distributions. Now, we will dene the set of population
shares which are arbitrarily close to any of the two equal sized group share
distributions:
B() := f 2 N jk   ek <  for some e 2 Bg
for some  > 0, k:k being the Euclidean norm.
Axiom 6. Consider a distribution in which each population group has the
same (normalized) density function fi(x) composed of two basic densities with
disjoint support sharing the same root as in Figure 3. Consider, moreover,
that the population shares vector  2 B() for some arbitrarily small  > 0.
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Figure 3: An inner basic density approaching an outer basic density within
all groups.
Slide the inner basic densities outwards, while keeping supports disjoint. Then
polarization must increase.
This axiom tries to capture the idea that if the di¤erent groups are made
more homogeneous, then polarization should increase. After this transfor-
mation, individuals feel less alienated with respect to the members of the
same group but more alienated with respect to the others. A couple of re-
marks are in order at this point. First, recall that this axiom captures the
idea that alienation between individuals of the same group is less important
than alienation between individuals of di¤erent groups, which we consider
a reasonable assumption. Second: in order to ensure that the axiom makes
sense, the population shares are imposed to be arbitrarily close to any of the
equal-sized two groups shares. If no restriction were imposed on the popula-
tion shares distribution, the axiom could make no sense at all: imagine, for
example, a distribution in which a single population concentrates the most
part of the mass and that the other (N   1) groups had a negligible mass.
In that case, an outward slide transformation as proposed in axiom 1 would
decrease polarization rather than increasing it because of the negligible e¤ect
of small groups on the nal result.
Axiom 7. Consider a distribution in which each population group has
the same (normalized) density function fi(x) composed of two basic densities
with disjoint support sharing the same root as in Figure 4. Assume that the
population shares are exactly the same for all groups (i.e:i = 1=N for all
i). Then, if all outer distributions are squeezed, polarization must increase.
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Figure 4: A -squeeze of the outer basic densities.
The intuition behind this axiom is the following. Assume that in each
group we have two subgroups, one consisting of low radicalized individuals
and another with highly radicalized ones. Then, when the most radicalized
individuals in each group are made more homogeneous or cohesive, they tend
to have a higher voicing power, so polarization is expected to rise.
Axiom 8. Consider a distribution having two equally populated groups
with the same basic density f(x). Then, if we shift mass from one of the
groups to the other, polarization should decrease.
This axiom captures the intuitive idea that any departure from the equally
weighted bipolar case should decrease polarization.
3.2 Characterization theorems (2).
Theorem 3. A polarization measure as dened in (9) satises axioms 4, 6,
7 and 8 if and only if it is proportional to
PN;(f) =
NP
i=1
Z Z
f 1+i (x)fi(y)jx yjdydx+
NP
i=1
P
j 6=i
Z Z
f 1+i (x)fj(y)(x+y)dydx
(10)
where  2 [ 1
3N 2 ; 1]:
This theorem characterizes axiomatically a social polarization index that
takes into account the existing social tensions between and within groups.
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As is well known, the value of  has to be treated as the degree of polar-
ization sensitivity (see ER(1994)) and the larger is its value, the greater is
the departure from inequality measurement. Looking at the statement of
Theorem 3, we can check that the lower bound of  is strictly positive but
that it depends on the number of population groups (1=(3N   2)). This is
an uncomfortableresult, as it states that the set of permissible values for
 widens as the number of groups gets larger and that, by taking an arbi-
trarily large number of groups, the admissible values of  could approach
the non-desirable value of 0 as much as desired. One possible way of raising
this lower bound is to impose axiom 5. In that case we would obtain the
following characterization result.
Theorem 4. A polarization measure as dened in equation (9) satises
axioms 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 if and only if it is of the form presented in equation
(10) with the additional restriction that   1=2:
This way, by adding a reasonable assumption, we are ruling out two
uncomfortable facts: 1. The dependency of the lower bound of  to the
values of N and 2. The fact that, for an arbitrary large number of groups,
the admissible values for  could approach too much the non-desirable value
of 0.
At this moment, it will be interesting to compare the social polariza-
tion indices that have arisen from the two models presented in this paper
and which are axiomatically characterized in Theorems 1 to 4. It can be
noted that PN;(f) and P bN;(f) provide di¤erent generalizations of the dis-
crete polarization measure DP (; k), and that each of which has its own
advantadges. From one side PN;(f) is a very detailed measure that takes
into account the degree to which each individual feels alienated vis-à-vis the
other individuals of the population regardless of the whether they belong to
the same population subgroup or not. However, this might be very demand-
ing from the information availability side, because in many cases it might be
very di¢ cult to measure the exact degree of radicalism of each individual.
From the other side, this problem is overcomed to a certain extent by using
P bN;(f), where the only information that is needed is the mean radicalism
degree of each population group. Even if this measure is less sensitive than
PN;(f) with respect to certain transformations of the radicalism degrees dis-
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tributions which might be of interest3, it has the great advantadge of making
use of aggregated data, which, in general, will be more readily available. The
formulation of P bN;(f) is not so cumbersome as that of PN;(f); so it might
be intuitively easier to understand. This might prove to be very useful for
any empirical application of the index.
4 An empirical illustration.
In this section, we will use empirical data to compare the values of the RQ
index with those of P bN; and PN;. For that purpose we will use data from
the World Value Surveys (WVS). These surveys have been conducted in
many countries all over the world since 1981, but for this empirical exercise
we will only use the surveys included in the fourth wave (WVS2000) to
ensure comparability. In overall, data is available for 79 countries. These
surveys contain a detailed questionnaire on religious issues, so it is easy to
compute an individual-level index of religious radicalism that can be used for
our polarization indices (a higher level of the index corresponds to a higher
involvement in religious-related issues and vice versa). Unfortunately, these
surveys do not contain enough information to construct an ethnic polarization
index4, so this interesting empirical exercise can not be carried out by the
moment.
In order to measure the level of intensity of individualsreligiosity feelings
we have used their reported answers to the question: How important is God
in your life?. That question has been asked in the 79 countries included in
our dataset. It could be answered in a [0; 10]-scale, which we have used as a
proxy of individualsreligiosity feelings.
3For example, the  squeeze transformation introduced in axiom 7 is a mean-
preserving transformation, so it is not detected by P bN;(f):
4Using the core questionnaire it is possible to nd out the ethnic distribution within
a given country. However, there is not enough information to derive the corresponding
radicalism degree distribution, which would tell us the extent to which individuals feel
identied with their ethnic group.
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Figure 5: Scatterplot of RQ versus P bN;:
4.1 Comparing religious polarization indices.
In this section we want to compare the values of RQ with the values of
P bN; and PN; when using WVS data at the country level. In particular, we
are interested in the similarity/dissimilarity between the country rankings
corresponding to the use of one index or another. Let us start by comparing
RQ with P bN; : in Figure 5 we present a scatterplot of its values.
As expected, there is a positive association between the values of RQ
and P bN;. However, it must be pointed out that the consistency between
both rankings tends to fade away as the values of RQ increase. That is:
for the set of countries which are highly polarized according to RQ (say, RQ
above 0,7), the corresponding ranking according to P bN; can be very di¤erent.
Clearly, this must be attributed to the role of religious intensity in P bN;. The
Spearman rank correlation coe¢ cient for the whole set of countries is 0,742.
Interestingly, if we restrict our attention to the countries for which RQ is
above 0,7, the Spearman rank correlation drops dramatically to -0,131. This
illustrates the lack of consistency between the corresponding rankings. Let
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Figure 6: Scatterplot of RQ versus PN;:
us now compare the values of RQ and PN;.: a scatterplot is presented in
Figure 6.
Here too we nd the expected positive relation between both indices.
However, the lack of consistency between the corresponding country rank-
ings is even more evident than before. As the values of RQ increase, the
variance of PN; increases too. Hence, for the set of countries which are
highly polarized according to RQ (say, RQ above 0,7), the corresponding
values of PN; have wide variations. The Spearman rank correlation coe¢ -
cient for the whole set of countries is only 0,12. Restricting our attention to
the set of countries for which RQ is above 0,7, the Spearman rank correla-
tion drops to -0,18, illustrating again the lack of consistency between both
rankings.
5 Conclusions.
The measurement of social polarization has not received much attention from
the literature. To the present date, most e¤orts have concentrated on the
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concept of income polarization, but nothing is said when the causes of con-
ict are not related to the distribution of income or wealth. Up to now, the
RQ index is the only one which, to our knowledge, has been introduced to
measure religious or ethnic polarization (see Montalvo and Reynal-Querol
2002, 2005a, 2005b). However, this index does only take into account the
sizes of the competing groups, but nothing is said about the feeling of alien-
ation between them. Confronted with the di¢ cult problem of dening and
operationalizing a distance function of alienation between groups, the au-
thors have opted for a simplifying compromise solution in which all groups
are assumed to feel equally alienated vis-à-vis each other. However, it is
intuitively clear that, other things being equal, the higher the feeling of an-
imosity between groups, the higher the corresponding level of social tension
and the probability of conict.
In this paper we have presented a couple of social polarization indices that
take into account the feeling of alienation between individuals. We assume
that alienation depends on the degree to which individuals feel identied
with their own social group. Our basic hypothesis is that the level of social
tension or the probability of conict are closely and monotonically related
with individuals feeling of involvement with their own group. In our rst
model, it is assumed that individuals within the same group do not feel
alienated between themselves whereas in the second model, room is made
to consider the existing tension within a given group. For both models we
present the respective axiomatically characterized social polarization indices,
P bN; and PN;, which can be seen as a generalization of the RQ index.
From one side, PN; is an interesting measure that takes into account
the existing alienation within and between groups. However, it must be
acknowledged that it is a computationally expensive measure, requiring a
great amount of data at the individual level, which sometimes is di¢ cult
to obtain in certain empirical applications. From the other side, P bN; is
a simpler measure which is somehow halfway between RQ and PN;. Its
greatest advantadges are that it is a conceptually simple measure (it can be
seen as the RQ index with an attached between-group distance function)
which is not computationally expensive, as it only uses the average feeling of
alienation of one group towards another. Hence, it might be a more attractive
measure for empirical purposes when detailed micro data is not available.
In the empirical section, we show that the religious polarization indices
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presented in this paper give very di¤erent country rankings when compared
with the rankings associated with the values of RQ using data from the
World Value Surveys. This means that introducing the notion of distance
between groups does make an important di¤erence when measuring the level
of social polarization. Again, this points out the shortcomings of the RQ
index as a social polarization index, which must be attributed to its lack of
sensitivity to the existing distances between competing groups. Finally, it
would be interesting to test the performance of P bN; and PN; as predictors
of the occurrence of Civil Wars (as is done in the paper of Montalvo and
Reynal-Querol (2005a)) and compare it with the corresponding performance
of the RQ index. However, this interesting research must await a future
paper.
6 Appendix.
6.1 Proof of Theorem 1.
The structure of the proof is as follows: Lemmas 1 and 2 show that T (; a)
must be linear in a for every  > 0. Lemma 3 shows that T (; a) must be
of the form k1+a, for some positive constants ; k: Finally, by lemma 4 we
can see that  must be lower than 1.
Lemma 1. The function T (i; a) must be concave in a for every i > 0.
Proof : We will show that axiom 1 implies that T (i; a) must be concave
in a for every i > 0. For a single population group, consider the distribution
shown in Figure 7 corresponding to the basic densities as in axiom 1. There
are two basic densities, each of which being a transformation of a uniform
basic density. The rst one, containing the less radicalized individuals, is
centered at x, its width is 2 and its height h()(> 0). Since we want the
population mass of this subgroup to remain constant in a process in which
 will be arbitrarily small, we must have that 2h() = h0 2 R+: Moreover,
one must have that x > 0 and x >  > 0. The outer density, containing the
more radicalized individuals, is centered at y, its width is 2 and its height
i()(> 0). As before, since the population mass of this subgroup must remain
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Figure 7: Two uniform densities approaching to each other within a group.
constant in a process in which  will be arbitrarily small, we must have that
2i() = i0 2 R+. Moreover, one must have that y > x and y    > x+  to
ensure that the supports are disjoint. Moreover, one must have that h0  i0
to ensure that the population mass of the inner density is not smaller than
the population mass of the outer one. An outer slide of the inner density
corresponds to an increase of the value of x. In order to ensure that the
supports remain disjoint throughout the slide (of amount ), one must have
that y      > x +  +  for some  > 0. The other population groups
have a single basic density centered at x, with width 2 and height k()(> 0),
with 2k() = k0 2 R+ . Since the population shares of the di¤erent groups
is the same, one must have that k0 = h0 + i0.
The total polarization formula as in (6) can be decomposed in terms of
 as follows:
(N   1) [
x++R
x+ 
x+R
x 
T (h0 + i0; b+ b
0)h()k()db0db+
y +R
y  
x+R
x 
T (h0+i0; b+b
0)i()k()db0db+
x+R
x 
x++R
x+ 
T (k0; b+b
0)h()k()db0db+
x+R
x 
y +R
y  
T (k0; b+ b
0)i()k()db0db] + C;
where C includes all those terms not depending on . Axiom 1 requires
that P ()  P (0) for all  2 (0;). This is equivalent to require that
(P ()  P (0))=(k()(N   1))  0. In particular, one must have that
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h()
"
R

R
 
T (k0; 2x++ b+ b
0)db0db+
R
 
R

T (k0; 2x++ b+ b
0)db0db
#
+
i()
"
R

R
 
T (k0; x+ y  + b+ b0)db0db+
R
 
R

T (k0; x+ y  + b+ b0)db0db
#

h()
"
R

R
 
T (k0; 2x+ b+ b
0)db0db+
R
 
R

T (k0; 2x+ b+ b
0)db0db
#
+
i()
"
R

R
 
T (k0; x+ y + b+ b
0)db0db+
R
 
R

T (k0; x+ y + b+ b
0)db0db
#
:
In the last expression, we can consider the specic case in which  = .
Moreover, by continuity this expression must also hold true as h() ! i()
so one must have that
R

R
 
T (k0; 2x++ b+ b
0)db0db+
R
 
R

T (k0; 2x++ b+ b
0)db0db+
R

R
 
T (k0; x+ y  + b+ b0)db0db+
R
 
R

T (k0; x+ y  + b+ b0)db0db 
R

R
 
T (k0; 2x+ b+ b
0)db0db+
R
 
R

T (k0; 2x+ b+ b
0)db0db+
R

R
 
T (k0; x+ y + b+ b
0)db0db+
R
 
R

T (k0; x+ y + b+ b
0)db0db:
Dividing both sides by  and taking  to zero and then doing the same
with , the last expression is equivalent to
T (k0; x
0 +) + T (k0; y0  )  T (k0; x0) + T (k0; y0);
where x0 = 2x; y0 = x+ y. Hence, one has that
T (k0; x
0 +)  T (k0; x0)  T (k0; y0)  T (k0; y0  );
for any x0 < y0 such that x0 +  < y0    for some  > 0.The last
expression implies that T (k0; a) must be concave in a for any k0 > 0.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 2. The function T (i; a) must be convex in a for every i > 0.
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Proof : We will show that axiom 2 implies that T (i; a) must be convex
in a for every i > 0. Let us start by considering the following basic densities
conguration. For the rst group we have a uniform density centered at
x > 0, with width 2 and height h(). Since we want the population mass of
this group to remain constant in a process in which  will be arbitrarily small,
we must have that 2h() = h0 2 R+:For the second group we have a uniform
density centered at y > 0, with width 2 and height i(). Since we want the
population mass of this group to remain constant in a process in which 
will be arbitrarily small, we must have that 2i() = i0 2 R+: Moreover, one
must have that h0  i0 to ensure that the population mass of the rst group
is not bigger than the population mass of the second one.Finally, the other
N   2 population groups are assumed to have a uniform density centered at
minfx; yg > 0, with width 2, height k() and 2k() = k0 2 R+. From
now on, we will assume that x  y, so minfx; yg = x. The other part of
the proof, when x  y, is completely analogous and will not be presented
here. If the amount of the slides described in axiom 2 is equal to , the total
polarization formula as in equation (6) can be decomposed as
(N   2)[
x +R
x  
x+R
x 
T (h0; b+ b
0)h()k()db0db+
y++R
y+ 
x+R
x 
T (i0; b+
b0)i()k()db0db+
x+R
x 
x +R
x  
T (k0; b+ b
0)h()k()db0db+
x+R
x 
y++R
y+ 
T (k0; b+ b
0)i()k()db0db]+
x +R
x  
y++R
y+ 
T (h0; b+b
0)h()i()db0db+
y++R
y+ 
x +R
x  
T (i0; b+b
0)h()i()db0db+C
where C includes all those terms not depending on . Axiom 2 requires
that P ()  P (0) for all  2 (0; x   ). This is equivalent to require that
(P ()  P (0))=k()  0. In particular, one must have that
h()
R

R
 
T (h0; 2x + b+ b0)db0db+ i()
R

R
 
T (i0; x+ y++ b+ b
0)db0db+
h()
R
 
R

T (k0; 2x + b+ b0)db0db+ i()
R
 
R

T (k0; x+y++ b+ b
0)db0db 
h()
R

R
 
T (h0; 2x+ b+ b
0)db0db+ i()
R

R
 
T (i0; x+ y + b+ b
0)db0db+
25
h()
R
 
R

T (k0; 2x+ b+ b
0)db0db+ i()
R
 
R

T (k0; x+ y + b+ b
0)db0db
In the last expression, we can consider the specic case  =  and choose
k0 = i0. Moreover, by continuity this expression must also hold true for any
 > 0 as h()! i() (in which case h0 ! i0) so one must have that
R

R
 
T (k0; 2x + b+ b0)db0db+
R

R
 
T (k0; x+ y ++ b+ b
0)db0db+
R
 
R

T (k0; 2x + b+ b0)db0db+
R
 
R

T (k0; x+ y ++ b+ b
0)db0db 
R

R
 
T (k0; 2x+ b+ b
0)db0db+
R

R
 
T (k0; x+ y + b+ b
0)db0db+
R
 
R

T (k0; 2x+ b+ b
0)db0db+
R
 
R

T (k0; x+ y + b+ b
0)db0db
Dividing both sides by  and taking  to zero and then doing the same
with , the last expression is equivalent to
T (k0; y
0 +)  T (k0; y0)  T (k0; x0)  T (k0; x0  );
where x0 = 2x; y0 = x + y (0  x  y), which implies that T (k0; a) must
be convex in a for any k0 > 0.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 3. (i) must be of the form ki, for some positive constants
; k:
Proof : We want to prove that  satises the fundamental Cauchy equa-
tion (p)(p0) = (pp0)(1) for every p; p0 > 0. Let us x p and p0 and dene
r = pp0. From now on we will assume that p  r. Assume that we have the
following conguration: for the rst two population groups we have a uni-
form density centered at 1 of width 2. The heights are p and h respectively.
The other N   2 population groups have negligible mass, so by continuity
they can be dispensed with. In this distribution, total polarization is equal
to
P = P b12 + P
b
21;
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where P bij is the total e¤ective antagonism felt by the individuals of pop-
ulation subgroup i towards the individuals of population subgroup j. Hence,
total polarization is proportional to
1+R
1 
1+R
1 
 (p) (b0 + b)phdb0db+
1+R
1 
1+R
1 
 (h) (b0 + b)phdb0db
After some computations, total polarization can be rewritten as
P = 42ph((p) + (h)):
We can now change the height of the densities centered at 1 to r. One
can check that for any , there exists a height h() for the densities centered
at 2 such that the polarizations of the two congurations can be equated.
Hence, using the last expression of P we can say that
ph((p) + (h)) = rh()((r) + (h()))
By axiom 4, for all  > 0;
2ph((p) + (h)) = 2rh()((r) + (h())):
Notice that, as  ! 0, h() ! h0 for some h0 > 0: By continuity of ,
when we pass to the limit, the last two equations can be rewritten as
ph((p) + (h)) = rh0((r) + (h0))
and
2ph((p) + (h)) = 2rh0((r) + (h0)):
Combining the last two expressions one has that
(p) + (h)
(p) + (h)
=
(r) + (h0)
(r) + (h0)
:
Taking limits as h ! 0 (therefore h0 ! 0), we have that for any  > 0,
the last expression reduces to
(p)
(p)
=
(r)
(r)
:
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Putting  = 1=p and recalling that r = pp0, the last expression yields the
required Cauchy equation. The class of solutions to this kind of equation is
given by (p) = kp for some positive constants ; k (see Aczél (1966)).
Q.E.D.
Lemma 4. Given that P bN;(f) is of the form shown in equation (7),
axiom 3 is satised if and only if   1:
Proof : Without loss of generality, we will assume that the whole popu-
lation mass (M) is normalized at 1. Hence, the population mass distribution
for the three groups will be simply 1  2x; x; x, where x denotes the amount
of population mass that is transferred from the big group to the smaller ones
(by the same amount). When x = 0 there is only a single group, when
x 2 (0; 1=3) there is a big group and two smaller groups and when x = 1=3
we have the uniform distribution. Recall that, since the size rank of the
groups is not allowed to be reversed in the transfer process, x can not be
greater than 1=3. Polarization can be written in terms of x as:
P (x) = 2

(1  2x)1+x+ x1+(1  2x) + x2+ (11)
where  > 0 is the mean radicalism degree of each group. According to
axiom 6, P (x) must be a non-decreasing function in x for all x 2 [0; 1=3].
Let us compute the rst derivative:
@P
@x
 (1  2x)1+ + x1+ + (1 + )[x(1  2x)  2x(1  2x)]:
One must nd which are the values of  for which (@P=@x)(x) is non-
negative for all x 2 [0; 1=3]. At this moment, we dene the following function:
f(x) :=
@P
@x
(x)
(1  2x)1+ = 1+

x
1  2x
1+
+(1+)

x
1  2x

  2

x
1  2x

:
Recall that if x 2 [0; 1=3]; (1   2x)1+ > 0, so the sign of (@P=@x)(x) is
the same as the sign of f(x). Renamig variables, we dene z = x=(1   2x),
so f(x) can be rewritten in terms of z as
g(z) = 1 + z1+ + (1 + ) [z   2z] :
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It is straightforward to check that for x 2 [0; 1=3], the function x=(1 2x)
increases monotonically and is bounded between 0 and 1. Hence, we have to
nd the values of  for which g(z) is non-negative for all z 2 [0; 1].
Observe that g(z) is a continuous function with g(0) = 1 and g(1) = 0.
Moreover, if we compute the derivative of g with respect to z we obtain
@g
@z
= (+ 1)z + (+ 1)[z 1   2]:
In particular, (@g=@z)(1) = 2(2   1). This means that for  > 1,
(@g=@z)(1) > 0. By continuity of g, for some arbitrarily small  > 0, one
must have that g(1   ) < 0. Hence, axiom 3 does not hold whenever 
happens to be strictly bigger than 1.
We will now prove that the sign of g(z) for z 2 [0; 1] when  2 (0; 1] can
not be negative. Assume the contrary: that is, assume that g(z) can be
negative for a certain range of values in [0; 1]. Since g(0) = 1, g(1) = 0 and
(@g=@z)(1)  0, by continuity of g it must follow that g(z) has at least 3
roots for z 2 [0; 1]. Now, this is impossible because g is dened as a linear
combination of three potential functions whose powers are between 0 and 2.
Hence, we have proven that when  2 (0; 1], g(z)  0; so (@P=@x)(x)  0
for all x 2 [0; 1=3]. This is the range of values of  for which axiom 3 holds.
This proves the lemma.
This completes the necessity part of the theorem. The su¢ ciency part is
completely straightforward, so it will not be shown here (it is available upon
request).
Q.E.D.
6.2 Proof of Theorem 2.
In theorem 1 we saw that PN(f) is proportional to
P
i
P
j 6=i 
1+
i j(i + j)
if and only if axioms 1, 2, 3 and 4 are satised. We only have to check the
e¤ect of imposing axiom 5 to this measure. According to axiom 5, the total
population mass (M) is divided into N equally populated groups. Moreover,
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for any i 2 f1; : : : ; Ng; the mean radicalism degree of group i equals . Total
polarization can be written in terms of N as
P (N) =
X
i
X
j 6=i

M
N
2+
2 = 2

M
N
2+
N(N   1)
What axiom 5 says is that P (N) should be a non-increasing function of
N . Let us simply compute the rst derivative:
@P
@N
= (2M2+)
(2N   1)N2+   (2 + )(N2  N)N1+
N4+2
=
=
2M2+
N3+
((2N   1)N   (2 + )(N2  N)): (12)
Manipulating the last expression a little bit and imposing that (@P=@)(N) 
0 one obtains that N + N(1 N)  0. This is equivalent to impose
  1
N   1 :
Since the number of groups (N) is greater or equal than 2 and (N   1) 1
is a decreasing function in N , a su¢ cient test case is to take N = 2. In that
case, one obtains that   1.
The su¢ ciency part is straightforward, so the theorem is proved.
Q.E.D.
6.3 Proof of Theorem 3.
The proof of theorem 3 is lengthy and technically involved. However, its
structure is analogous to the proof of the main characterization theorem
presented in DER (theorem 1). Firstly one must establish that axioms 4,
6, 7 and 8 imply the functional form shown in equation (10). Then, in
proving the su¢ ciency part, one can establish the bounds for . Since the
underlying ideas in each of the di¤erent steps are similar and there are only
some technical di¤erences, the proof will not be shown here, but is available
upon request. The only part of the proof we will reproduce here is the one
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concerning the bounds of . In Lemmas 5 and 6 we establish the upper and
lower bounds of  respectively.
Lemma 5. Given that PN;(f) is of the form shown in equation (10),
axiom 8 is satised if and only if   1:
Proof. Without loss of generality, we will assume that the whole popu-
lation mass (M) is normalized at 1. The rst basic density, which is denoted
by f(x), has a support [a; b] with mean  and root f . Let m =   a. The
second basic density is the same as the rst one but translated d units away.
In order to have disjoint supports, one must have that d > 2m. The amount
of population mass that is transferred from one group to the other is denoted
by . Using lemmas 6 and 7 in DER we can write polarization in terms of
 as follows:
P(f;) = (4km
1  1(f
; ))
 
1
2
+ 
2+
+

1
2
 
2+!
+
2kdm  2(f
; )
"
1
2
+ 
1+
1
2
 

+

1
2
 
1+
1
2
+ 
#
:
Now, according to axiom 8, P(f;) should have a maximum at  = 0.
Hence, we need to compute the rst and second derivatives of P(f;) with
respect to . Computing @P(f;)
@
we obtain
4km1  1(f
; )(2 + )
 
1
2
+ 
1+
 

1
2
 
1+!
+
2kdm  2(f
; )"
1
2
 
1+
 

1
2
+ 
1+
+ (1 + )
 
1
4
 2
 
1
2
 
1 
 

1
2
+ 
1 !!#
Clearly, @P(f;=0)
@
= 0, so = 0 is a critical point of P(f;). Now,
@2P(f;)
@2
is equal to
4km1  1(f
; )(2 + )(1 + )

1
2
+ 

+

1
2
 

+
2kdm  2(f
; )(1 + )
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
((
1
2
+ ) 1(
1
2
 ) + (1
2
 ) 1(1
2
+ ))  2

1
2
+ 

+

1
2
 

:
Hence, one has that @
2P(f;=0)
@2
is equal to
4km1  1(f
; )(2 + )(1 + )

1
2
 1
+
2kdm  2(f
; )(1 + )
"


1
2
 1
  2

1
2
 1#
:
Inspecting the last expression, we see that the rst term is always positive
and that the second one can be negative. Hence, and given the fact that
d > 2m, a necessary and su¢ cient test case to test whether @
2P(f;=0)
@2
 0
is to impose d = 2m: Moreover, by lemma 8 in DER, one has that, for any
 > 0;  2(f
; ) =   1(f
; ) for some    3: In that case, after some
computations we can rewrite @
2P(f;=0)
@2
as
4km1  1(f
; )(1 + )

1
2
 1
[2 + +  (  2)] :
Finally, we have to check which are the values of  for which [2 + +  (  2)] 
0: If the last restriction must hold true, one must have that
  2

   1
  + 1

;
Now, since (   1)=( +1) is an increasing function in   and    3, from
the last expression we deduce that   1:This proves the lemma.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 6. Given that PN;(f) is of the form shown in equation (10),
axiom 7 is satised if and only if   1
3N 2 :
Proof : Consider a conguration as given in axiom 7. Each fi(x) is com-
posed of the same two basic densities with disjoint support. The inner density
will be denoted by g. Let n be the di¤erence from its mean to its lower sup-
port and q its population mass. Its mean will be denoted by : The outer
density will be denoted by h. Let m be the di¤erence from its mean to its
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lower support and p its population mass. We will denote the distance between
the means of the two basic densities (within each group) by d. Moreover,
we are assuming that all groups are equally numerous, i.e: i = 1=N for all
i 2 f1; : : : ; Ng: Hence, one should have that p+ q = 1=N . Total polarization
in this conguration is simply
PN;(f) = NP
w +N(N   1)P b
where Pw is the internal polarization within each group and P b is the
total antagonism felt between the members of any couple of groups. We will
now decompose Pw and P b in terms of ; where the terms insenstive to 
will not be explicitly described. Clearly, one has the usual decomposition
Pw() = Pg + Ph() + P
w
gh + P
w
hg()
which, by Lemmas 6 and 7 in DER can be rewritten as
Pw() =
Pg + 4
 
p
N
2+
(m)1  1(h
; ) + Pwgh + 2d
 
p
N
1+   q
N

(m)  2(h
; ):
Recall that the denitions of  1(:; );  2(:; ) were presented in lemma
10 (DER). Analogously
P b() = P bgg + P
b
hh() + P
b
gh + P
b
hg()
which, by lemma 7 in DER can be rewritten as
P b() = P bgg + 2
 
p
N
2+
(2d+ 2)(m)  2(h
; )+
P bgh + 2
 
p
N
1+   q
N

(d+ 2)(m)  2(h
; ):
This way, we can write total polarization in terms of  as:
PN;(f ; ) = C +D
h
21  +  (h; ) 
h
qd
pm
+ (N   1)
h
q(d+2)
pm
+ 2d+2
m
iii
where C includes all those terms not depending on  , D is a positive
constant equal to
 
1
N
1+
2m1  1(h
; ) and
 (h; ) =  2(h
;)
 1(h
;)
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Hence, in order to prove the lemma we have to show that
21  +  (h; ) 
h
qd
pm
+ (N   1)
h
q(d+2)
pm
+ 2d+2
m
ii
is nonincreasing in  over (0; 1]. Observing the last expression, we can
see that, since   and 1  are decreasing and increasing functions in 
respectively (recall that  is known to be smaller or equal to 1), a necessary
and su¢ cient test case to prove the lemma is to consider values of q and
 arbitrarily close to 0. Using the same argument, one should make d=m
as small as possible: its smallest possible value is 1 (otherwise, the disjoint
support hypothesis would not be satised). Hence, we need to show that, for
every root h,
1  + (N   1) (h; ) 
is nonincreasing in  over (0; 1]. Di¤erentiating the last expression we
have that
(1  )    (N   1) (h; )  1
must be nonpositive for  2 (0; 1]. This is equivalent to impose that
  1
1+(N 1) (h;) :
By lemma 8 in DER, we know that  (h; ) attains its minimum value
when h corresponds to a uniform distribution, and that this minimum value
is 3. Hence,  must be greater or equal than (3N   2) 1.
Q.E.D.
6.4 Proof of theorem 4.
According to theorem 3, a polarization index as dened in (7) is proportional
to PN;(f) if and only if axioms 4, 6, 7, 8 are satised. Let us now check
what happens when axiom 5 is imposed. Without loss of generality, we
will assume that the whole population mass (M) is normalized at 1 so, by
symmetry, the population shares i will be equal to 1=N . Total polarization
can be decomposed as
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PN;(f) = NP
w +N(N   1)P b;
where Pw is the internal polarization within groups and P b is the polar-
ization between groups. Now, if we use lemma 6 (DER) with  = 1 we have
that
Pw = 4k
 
1
N
2+
m1  1(f
; )
where k is a positive constant, m is the distance between the mean and
the lower tail of the basic density. From the other side, using lemma 7 (DER)
with  = 1 we obtain
P b = 2k(2)
 
1
N
2+
m  2(f
; );
where  is the mean of the basic density. Recall that, by denition,
m  : Substituting the last two expressions into PN;(f) we obtain
PN;(f) = 4km
    1
N
1+
(m 1(f
; ) + (N   1) 2(f ; ));
If axiom 5 has to be satised, one must have that @PN;(f)
@N
 0: Di¤eren-
tiating the last expression with respect to N , we obtain
 (1 + )   1
N
2+
(m 1(f
; ) + (N   1) 2(f ; )) +
 
1
N
1+
 2(f
; );
where we have dropped the constant term 4km . Rearranging the last
expression, one obtains
@PN;(f)
@N
   1
N
2+
[(1 + )( m 1(f ; ) +  2(f ; ))  N 2(f ; )] :
Observe that the term ( m 1(f ; ) +  2(f ; )) must be positive, be-
cause m   and, (by lemma 8 (DER))  2(f ; ) =   1(f ; ) for some
   3. Hence, a necessary and su¢ cient test case to prove the theorem is to
consider the lowest possible value of N (which is 2) and the highest possible
value of m (which is ). In that case, one should impose that
(1 + )( 2(f
; )   1(f ; ))  2 2(f ; )  0:
Manipulating a little bit, we see that this is satised when
   2(f;)  1(f;)
 2(f
;)+ 1(f;)
=   1
 +1
:
Clearly, the lowest possible value for this function when    3 is 1=2, so
the theorem is proven.
Q.E.D.
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